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The Value of Deviance:
Understanding Contextual Privacy
Timothy Casey*
The value of deviance lies in highlighting the infirmity in our present
concept of privacy. Deviance helps explain privacy in two ways. First,
deviance helps define what might be protected by “privacy concerns.”
Second, a sociological definition of deviance provides a helpful model to
rebut the popular “Nothing to Hide” argument and to understand a nonbinary concept of contextual privacy. This article uses a sociological
definition of deviance to explain a contextual idea of privacy, where the
critical inquiry is not a dualistic response to whether sensitive information
deserves protection as private or not, but rather a contextual analysis of the
disclosure of information that includes the type of information, to whom
disclosure was made, by whom, for what purpose, and to what potential
detriment. A deeper understanding of deviance brings us to the realization
that we shape our identities through a contextual disclosure of our
differences, and that personal control over those disclosures is a value
worthy of protection.
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INTRODUCTION
This article explains the value of deviance. Whether in a mathematical
or sociological context, deviance describes difference. From a
sociological perspective, deviance can be observed in behaviors or
tendencies, physical characteristics, or even thoughts or ideas. The
defining feature of deviance—the thing that makes something deviant—
is difference, there must be something that separates the deviant from the
normal, and that difference must generate a negative consequence.
Typically, that negative consequence manifests itself in a social context,
such as being stigmatized or ostracized from a group. This social
consequence, in turn, may result in a suppression of the difference.
Sometimes that suppression is a good thing, for example, when a deviant
behavior causes physical harm to another. But in other contexts, deviance
can stifle engagement in valuable activities such as discussing medical
conditions, joining social groups, or expressing political views.
In a digital era, deviance provides a helpful lens to examine exchanges
of information and concepts of privacy. The ease of aggregating, storing,
and distributing vast quantities of information magnifies the suppression
effect. Because deviance depends on the imposition of sanctions by
others, the manner and extent of disclosure of information matters. Until
very recently, both constitutional and civil precedents declined to
recognize harm from the distribution of information. In Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, the “third-party doctrine” prevented an
individual from asserting a reasonable expectation of privacy in
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information disclosed to a third party—any third party.1 In civil contexts,
courts have been reluctant to find “injury in fact” where the plaintiff
asserted only a naked disclosure of information without an additional
allegation of harm or damages.2
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Carpenter v. United States and
a recent decision by the Illinois Supreme Court in Rosenbach v. Six Flags
Entertainment Corporation3 both signal a shift in the traditional
understanding of harm to individuals emanating from the collection and
distribution of sensitive information. Carpenter involved the capture and
use of cell site location information (CSLI), which provides a record of a
person’s movement by tracking the signaling information of the subject’s
cell phone.4 The Court grappled with two questions: first, does the
capture of CSLI constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, and second, was the search reasonable? In a significant
1. The “third-party” doctrine developed from two Supreme Court cases, Miller v. United States,
425 U.S. 435, 444 (1976), and Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979). Since Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), a government intrusion constitutes a search under the Fourth
Amendment when the actions violate the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test. Smith, 442 U.S.
at 740. In Miller, the Court found no reasonable expectation of privacy in the government’s
acquisition through subpoena of defendant’s bank records, including cancelled checks. Miller, 425
U.S. at 440–43. In Smith, the Court found no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers
dialed from a telephone where the government used a pen register device to record the outgoing
numbers dialed from defendant’s phone line. Smith, 442 U.S. at 741–45. The Court held “a person
has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”
Id. at 743–44. In each case, the Court relied on the defendant’s disclosure, in Miller to the bank and
in Smith to the phone company, of the information to a third party. Miller, 425 U.S. at 443; Smith,
442 U.S. at 744–45. Over time the third-party doctrine has been severely criticized. See, e.g., Daniel
B. Yeager, Search, Seizure and the Positive Law: Expectations of Privacy Outside the Fourth
Amendment, 84 J. CRIM. L. & C. 249, 251–52 (1993); Richard A. Epstein, Privacy and the Third
Hand: Lessons from the Common Law of Reasonable Expectations, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1199
(2009); Erin Murphy, The Case Against the Case for Third-Party Doctrine: A Response to Epstein
and Kerr, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1239 (2009) (responding to Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the
Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561 (2009)).
2. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 414 n.5 (2013). See generally Spokeo, Inc.
v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016); Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2012). The
issue of pleading sufficient harm to meet standing requirements in surveillance cases, such as
Clapper, 568 U.S. at 422–23 (Breyer, J., dissenting), or in data breach cases, such as Resnick, 693
F.3d at 1329–30, is an interesting issue of civil procedure and one that lies beyond the scope of this
article.
3. Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., No. 123186, 2019 WL 323902, at *8 (Ill. Jan. 25,
2019). A similar case, Patel v. Facebook, Inc., was just decided in the Ninth Circuit. See generally
Patel v. Facebook, Inc., No. 18-15982, 2019 WL 3727424 (9th Cir. Aug. 8, 2019) (holding the
district court did not abuse its discretion regarding the predominance requirement and superiority
requirement).
4. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). See Timothy Casey, Electronic
Surveillance and the Right to Be Secure, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 977, 1005–10 (2008) (examining
the litigation history of cell site location information).
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move, the Court limited the third-party doctrine, which had excluded
from fourth amendment protection information disclosed to third parties.5
In reaching its conclusion, the Carpenter majority opinion sharply
curtailed the third-party doctrine and emphasized that the Fourth
Amendment protected “privacy concerns,” even where those concerns
were unconnected to an intrusion on a property interest.6
In Rosenbach, the plaintiff sued under the Biometric Information
Privacy Act (BIPA) in Illinois.7 The statute requires notice and consent
when biometric information is collected or stored.8 At issue was whether
a plaintiff could sustain a cause of action without pleading specific injury
from the violation of the statute.9 The Illinois Supreme Court concluded
that separate allegations of harm were unnecessary to sustain a cause of
action for a violation of the BIPA.10
These decisions signal a new understanding of the concept of privacy
and provide additional guidance on the question of what exactly is
protected by a privacy interest. Under previous Fourth Amendment
precedents, a search occurs when the government intrudes on an area
protected by a “reasonable expectation of privacy.”11 The third-party
doctrine held that there could be no reasonable expectation of privacy
where information is disclosed to another party—any other party. Thus,
under this doctrine, the only way to maintain an expectation of privacy
was to never reveal the information. A disclosure to one person was
treated the same as a publication to the entire world.
Sometimes there is value in disclosing information in a limited
manner. The third-party doctrine’s binary conception of privacy ignored
5. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217. See also Id. at 2220 (“We therefore decline to extend Smith
and Miller to the collection of CSLI.”).
6. Compare Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214 n.1 (citations omitted) (“Katz of course ‘discredited’
the ‘premise that property interests control,’ . . . and we have repeatedly emphasized that privacy
interests do not rise or fall with property rights . . . .”), with Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2224 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting) (arguing for a “property-based concept” of Fourth Amendment protection).
7. Illinois Biometric Information Protection Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/1–99 (2008).
8. Id.
9. Rosenbach, 2019 WL 323902, at *1 (“The central issue in this case . . . is whether one
qualifies as an ‘aggrieved’ person and may seek liquidated damages and injunctive relief pursuant
to the Act if he or she has not alleged some actual injury or adverse effect, beyond violation of his
or her rights under the statute.”).
10. Id. at *6.
11. Justice Roberts articulated the reasonable expectation of privacy standard as follows: “When
an individual ‘seeks to preserve something as private,’ and his expectation of privacy is ‘one that
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable,’ we have held that official intrusion into that private
sphere generally qualifies as a search and requires a warrant supported by probable cause.”
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2209 (citation omitted).
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the possibility that a teenager suffering from depression might want to
meet privately with other teens with the same condition,12 or that a gay
or transgender person might want to find a relationship without
publishing to the world intimate details of gender identity or sexual
preferences 13, or that a sperm donor might not want to be identified by
the family of a biological child,14 or that a person curious about a
hereditary medical condition might not want a DNA sample provided to
a private company to be shared with the FBI. 15 Each of these scenarios
involves disclosure of information about deviance. And each of these
scenarios suggests the value of a contextual disclosure of information,
where a disclosure for a limited purpose or to a limited degree is very
different from a wholesale disclosure to all.
The law is moving—slowly—toward the “contextual” understanding
of privacy. Carpenter recognized that a single observation of a person
making a phone call was contextually different from a perpetual
catalogue of a person’s movements. Although the information gathered
through a police officer’s physical observation of a suspect—the
suspect’s location—was qualitatively the same as the location
information provided by CSLI, the pervasive and vast quantity of
information—a continuous recording of the suspect’s location—made a
difference. In Rosenbach, the court focused on the quality or nature of the
information collected—an individual’s biometric markers. The
Rosenbach court found that the quality of information meant that the
disclosure and consent requirements of the statute were not “merely
12. See Madeline Halpert & Eva Rosenfeld, Depressed, But Not Ashamed, N.Y. TIMES, (May
22, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/22/opinion/depressed-but-not-ashamed.html [https:
//perma.cc/C5LY-DC4H] (recounting the story of high school administrators prohibiting teenagers
from publishing their own stories of mental health challenges because they “might regret it later”).
13. See Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1257 (11th Cir. 2017) (denying claim for
discrimination based on sexual orientation). The question of whether sexual orientation falls under
the protection of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act is currently under review by the Supreme Court.
Bostock v. Clayton Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 723 Fed. App’x 964 (11th Cir. 2018) (mem.) (per
curiam), cert. granted sub. nom., Bostock v. Clayton Cty., Ga., 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019) (mem.)
(consolidated with Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc), cert.
granted, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019) (mem.)).
14. Jacqueline Mroz, A Mother Learns the Identity of Her Child’s Grandmother. A Sperm Bank
Threatens to Sue., N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/16/health/
sperm-donation-dna-testing.html [https://perma.cc/V42Z-Y9DA].
15. Salvador Hernandez, One of the Biggest At-Home DNA Testing Companies Is Working with
the FBI, BUZZFEED NEWS (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/
salvadorhernandez/family-tree-dna-fbi-investigative-genealogy-privacy [https://perma.cc/TY4BEPBG]; see also Matthew Haag, FamilyTreeDNA Admits to Sharing Genetic Data with the F.B.I.,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/04/business/family-tree-dnafbi.html [https://perma.cc/9EFA-NYHM].
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technical in nature.”16 The foundation of both decisions lies in the
realization that information ostensibly gathered for one purpose could
easily be misappropriated for another more nefarious purpose, causing
harm to the individual. Before these two decisions, courts had approached
the privacy of information as a binary concept: the information was either
private and therefore protected from intrusion under the law or it was not.
In contrast, under contextual privacy, the scope of what is considered
protected as private depends on the quality and quantity of the
information, as well as to whom the information is disclosed, for what
purpose, and to what potential detrimental effect.
It turns out that deviance provides a useful model for understanding
contextual privacy because both privacy and deviance are misunderstood
as binary principles. At first blush it might seem that a behavior or
characteristic is either deviant or not, depending on how the behavior or
characteristic falls in comparison to norms within a population. A better
understanding of deviance requires a more nuanced examination. In
deviance, a behavior, characteristic, or idea only becomes deviant when
viewed from an external perspective—meaning it is observed, compared,
and distinguished from “normal”—and importantly, when the normative
group applies a negative consequence. People sharing the same deviant
characteristic are not deviant when observed and compared to each other.
They are only considered deviant when compared to those outside of the
insular group. Like deviance, privacy is not binary. An individual might
want to disclose information to one person, but not to others. It may be
important, but difficult to quantify, why a person would have an interest
in controlling the disclosure of personal information, especially when that
information reveals intimate details.
Deviance carries a pejorative connotation: a common understanding of
deviance might include aberrant, illegal, and immoral behavior. While
some deviant behavior is illegal and subjects the actor to punishment,
deviance can also apply to static characteristics and behaviors, or medical
conditions over which the actor has no control. Moreover, there may be
artistic and social value acquired through expressions of deviance.
Examples of valuable deviance include creative enterprises, such as art
and music, where the unique nature of a composition can be so different

16. “In reaching a contrary conclusion, the appellate court characterized violations of the law,
standing alone, as merely ‘technical’ in nature. . . . Such a characterization, however,
misapprehends the nature of the harm our legislature is attempting to combat through this
legislation.” Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., No. 123186, 2019 WL 323902, at *6 (Ill. Jan.
25, 2019) (citation omitted).
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as to be initially rejected or scorned, and only later recognized to hold
inherent artistic value.17 Art, music, and literature are full of examples of
works that were considered deviant, only later to be recognized as
brilliant. Some behaviors or characteristics that were once considered
deviant have become commonplace because more people openly engage
in the behavior or display the characteristic. In some situations, such as
political expression or civil disobedience, deviant behavior has a moral
justification.
Privacy also carries a pejorative connotation, summarized in the
common refrain that privacy only matters if one has something to hide.
Just as the common understanding of deviance is mistaken, this common
rebuttal to questions about protecting private information is also
mistaken. Even though Professor Daniel Solove and others have artfully
responded to the nothing to hide argument, it persists.18
This paper explains the concept of deviance, primarily from a
sociological perspective, and applies the concept to the popular retort to
claims of privacy—the nothing to hide argument—which continues to
carry weight in public discussions. Beginning with the most simplistic
definition of deviance, Section I explains theories describing deviance.
Deviance is not synonymous with illegal. Indeed, deviant behavior may
be perfectly legal, and illegal behavior may not be considered deviant.
Section I notes that deviance is highly contextual and relational,
depending not only on the specific behavior or characteristic, but also on
the group that defines or enforces the characteristic as deviant. Section I
also provides several examples of how deviance can change, either by
new definitions of normal or by elimination of the negative reaction and
stigma necessary for classification as deviant. These historic examples
highlight the importance of context in defining deviance and demonstrate
the relative and non-static nature of deviant behavior or deviant
characteristics. Section I concludes with an invitation to compare
concepts of deviance to concepts of privacy.
Section II applies the concept of deviance to the nothing to hide
argument. The first part of Section II explains the strong and the weak

17. See generally DICK HEBDIGE, SUBCULTURE: THE MEANING OF STYLE (1979) (an iconic
description of the development of trends among British youth as rebellion against expected norms
and expression of individual identity). History reveals many examples of art that was initially
banned, censored, or deemed “degenerate.” Before censors focused on rap lyrics, jazz, and rock
music were in the censors’ crosshairs. In 1937, a large collection of modern art was deemed
“degenerate” by the Nazi Party. See generally POLITICAL CENSORSHIP OF THE VISUAL ARTS IN
NINETEENTH CENTURY EUROPE (Robert Goldstein & Andrew Nedd, eds., Palgrave MacMillan
2015). For more specific examples, see infra Section I.C.3.
18. See infra Part II.
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versions of the nothing to hide argument. The successful rebuttal of the
strong version of the nothing to hide argument relies on an expanded
definition of privacy as a multi-dimensional, relational, and contextual
concept. Section II examines the nothing to hide argument in the dialogue
between the majority and the dissenters in Carpenter. The last part of
Section II connects contextual privacy to deviance.
Section III argues that there is inherent value to deviance. On an
abstract level, society gains through increased levels of diversity—even
where that diversity fits the definition of deviance. Attempts to stifle
deviant beliefs, behaviors, or characteristics through increased social
control, such as monitoring or surveillance, have a poor track record of
success.19 Increased surveillance raises the risk of an out-of-context
disclosure of sensitive personal information that could lead to negative
treatment of an individual with behaviors, beliefs, or characteristics that
differ from the norm. As described in more detail below, a difference only
becomes deviant with the imposition of a negative consequence.20 By
retaining control of disclosures, individuals can assimilate with those who
do not share the potentially deviant differences, as well as with those who
share the differences.
In sum, a better understanding of the concept of deviance not only adds
value to specific policy debates about privacy and security, but also
expands our understanding of the importance of diversity in our
communities.
Thus the value of deviance turns out to have several meanings. First,
the concept of deviance provides a useful model for understanding
contextual privacy. Second, the value of deviance signifies the
importance of diversity of the human condition (at least where there is no
harm to others). Finally, deviance offers insight into personal autonomy
and how individuals define themselves, especially in the digital world.
Although we share much in common, the things that define us are our
differences. We define ourselves in the way we recognize our
19. Although many arguments about the danger of surveillance rely on the stifling effect on
freedoms of speech and association, the research to support these claims is rather thin. Sociological
research tends to support the notion that increased measures of social control create more deviant
behavior, such that social control is a cause of deviance. Neither side of the privacy versus security
debate will find this satisfying—on one hand we conclude that surveillance does not have a
deterrent effect, and therefore other justifications must exist for its use; on the other hand we must
rely on other explanations of the harm of surveillance. See generally David Sklansky, Too Much
Information: How Not to Think About Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 102 CALIF. L. REV.
1069 (2014) (explaining the difficulties with the stultification thesis).
20. The negative consequences frequently consisted of the imposition of a social stigma or an
exclusion from social groups. See infra Sections I.B, I.C.
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differences—our deviances, our intimate feelings, our creative
thoughts—and we shape our identities in the way we share these details
with others.21
I. DEFINING DEVIANCE
The term deviance derives from the examination of differences.
Mathematical definitions of deviation begin with an examination of data
for central tendencies and dispersion—in simple terms, the way data tend
to clump together.22 The standard deviation refers simply to degrees of
difference from an average value. In applying the concept of deviance to
human behaviors, beliefs, or characteristics, it may be helpful, but not
necessary, to analyze whether a given behavior, belief, or characteristic
is statistically deviant within a general population—or the extent of the
deviation. The critical notion is that there is a definable difference when
compared to a dominant norm or group.
A sociological definition of deviance applies to behaviors, beliefs, or
characteristics that are likely to generate a negative reaction from
others.23 Social scientists use three central questions to determine when
deviance exists.24 First, is the behavior, belief, or characteristic different
from normal, expected, or proscribed behaviors, beliefs, or
characteristics?25 Second, is there an audience or a group that judges this
21. Some sociologists attribute identity and conceptions of self to the way one interacts with
others. See, e.g., GEORGE H. MEAD, MIND, SELF, AND SOCIETY: THE DEFINITIVE EDITION (Hans
Joas & Daniel R. Huebner eds., ann ed. 2015) (Charles W. Morris ed., 1934); Timothy J. Owens,
Dawn T. Robinson & Lynn Smith-Lovin, Three Faces of Identity, 36 ANN. REV. SOC. 477 (2010)
(discussing how identity is based on conceptions of self and social positions that exist outside of
the individual).
22. For example, if we were to examine the physical characteristic of height in humans, we
would expect to find that most of the population falls close to the mean, with a few people who are
either extremely tall or extremely short. The central tendency describes the clumping together of
heights in the middle of the range of values for height. Central tendency can be measured by
calculating the mean or average height. The degree to which heights are dispersed in terms of the
frequency of extremely tall people and how much taller than the average person a person must be
to be considered extremely tall can be measured by the standard deviation. See generally SARAH
BOSLAUGH & PAUL ANDREW WATTERS, STATISTICS IN A NUTSHELL: A DESKTOP QUICK
REFERENCE 55–63 (Mary Treseler ed., 1st ed. 2008) (explaining the basics of statistics, specifically
how to identify standard deviation and outsiders in a pool of data).
23. ERICH GOODE, DEVIANT BEHAVIOR 7 (9th ed. 2011). It bears noting that in general
sociologists do not attribute a value to deviance, in the sense that deviance is inherently good or
bad. Rather, their interest lies in describing, explaining and understanding the concept. As noted
below, for some powerful sectors of society, there may not be a “negative” consequence. See infra
Section I.B.2 on Constructivist Theories of Deviance.
24. HOWARD S. BECKER, OUTSIDERS: STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE 1–39 (1963);
GOODE, supra note 23, at 7.
25. I have included “characteristics” as well as behaviors. In the sociological definition, the
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difference?26 Third, does discovery of the difference result in a negative
consequence such as mockery, censure, scorn, punishment, stigma,
isolation, or public condemnation?”27 In addition to these central
questions, sociologists examine how norms are established and
communicated, and how differences from norms emerge and propagate.
The classification of a behavior, belief, or characteristic as deviant
depends on both the actor and the audience. Deviance is contextual. In
many cases, the same behavior, belief, or characteristic will be considered
deviant among one group of people and non-deviant within another
group.28 In fact, a deviant behavior, belief, or characteristic may create
interpersonal relationships based on a shared experience.29 As discussed
below, these interpersonal relationships, and the ideas generated and
shared through them, have value both to the individuals involved, and to
society at large by increasing the diversity of thought and promoting the
exchange of ideas.
Because the term deviance is not defined according to a purely
objective standard, but depends instead on the subjective reactions of an
audience, the manner and scope of information disclosures matters.
Information regarding one’s deviance may provide value to the
individual. But the same information, revealed in a different context, may
critical inquiry involves the reaction to the attribute, not the attribute itself. Sociologists distinguish
between an achieved status and an ascribed status, but this distinction does not bear weight in the
definition of deviance. GOODE, supra note 23, at 13; see also PATRICIA ADLER & PETER ADLER,
CONSTRUCTION OF DEVIANCE: SOCIAL POWER, CONTEXT, AND INTERACTION 8–9 (2009)
(identifying the “ABC’s of deviance” as attitudes, behaviors, conditions). Thus, if there is a
difference, a judge, and a negative consequence to the discovery of the attribute, then it is
considered deviant. Id.
26. BECKER, supra note 24, at 15–18 (discussing who are considered deviant “outsiders” and
who are “normal” members to identify the deviance); GOODE, supra note 23, at 6.
27. BECKER, supra note 24, at 8–14 (noting how others respond to deviant behavior); GOODE,
supra note 23, at 6. See also ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF
SPOILED IDENTITY (1963) (reviewing the work on stigma to formulate concepts on the information
individuals convey about themselves). See generally Bruce G. Link & Jo C. Phelan,
Conceptualizing Stigma, 27 ANN. REV. SOC. 363 (2001) (redefining the term stigma). Here I use
“public condemnation” to mean something different from “expressive condemnation.” Michel
Foucault described the importance of expressive condemnation as a way for communities to express
disdain and disapproval for the actions. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH
(Alan Sheridan trans., 1977) (1975). Tracy Meares and other scholars have applied the concept of
expressive condemnation to policy debates on issues of criminal law. See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan &
Tracy L. Meares, Punishment, Deterrence and Social Control: The Paradox of Punishment in
Minority Communities, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 173 (2008); Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares,
The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153 (1998).
28. The same condition may provide the holder with an advantage in one context and subject to
the holder to penalties in another context. See infra Section I.C.1.
29. See, e.g., HEBDIGE, supra note 17, at 151 n.18 (describing the mod, punk, and other youth
cultures where members shared the same “deviance”).
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subject the individual to scorn, stigmatization, ostracism, discrimination,
or worse. Therefore, a person has an interest in controlling information
related to a deviant belief, behavior, or characteristic. The degree to
which a person values privacy may depend on the type of information
disclosed and the audience receiving the disclosure. The concept of
deviance, like the concept of privacy, is more complex and contextual
than is immediately apparent. A proper understanding of deviance helps
us to define exactly what is at stake when we assert privacy interests. But
before examining the sociological definitions of deviance, let’s look at an
example.
A. A Basic Example of Deviance
A survey conducted in Middletown found that 50% of pedestrians
jaywalked across the intersection of Main Street and First Avenue. One
year ago, a pedestrian jaywalking across Main Street in Middletown was
struck by a vehicle and seriously injured. Middletown recently installed
closed-circuit cameras to monitor the intersection. After the installation
of the closed-circuit camera, a new survey found that only 30% of
pedestrians jaywalked across the street. The cameras were located in
obvious positions on the streetlamps, and signs on each corner informed
pedestrians about the cameras. The cameras worked intermittently—
sometimes they were on and sometimes they were off—but there was no
way to tell whether the cameras were on or off. Jaywalking is a violation
of the municipal code, punishable by a fine of $25. In addition, the names
of violators are published in the local newspaper in well-read section
entitled the “Police Blotter.”
Yesterday, Nic stood at the intersection of Main Street and First
Avenue in Middletown. The light was red in the direction Nic wanted to
proceed. Nonetheless, Nic jaywalked across the street. Andi, another
pedestrian standing next to Nic, proceeded across the street as well,
closely following Nic. At the other side of the intersection, Andi turned
to Nic and said, “hope we meet again, fellow jaywalker,” before walking
away.
Nic, a lawyer, charges $300 per hour, billed in ten-minute increments.
On the day in question, Nic was running late to a meeting. Nic could make
it to the meeting on time only if he jaywalked across the intersection. The
difference between arriving late to the meeting and arriving on time to
the meeting meant that Nic would lose ten minutes of billed time, even
though the delay caused by waiting for the light to change would be only
two minutes.
With this example in mind, let’s turn to an explanation of the formal
definitions of deviance.
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B. Sociological Definitions of Deviance
Sociologists study the actions that comprise deviance and the causes
of deviance.30 But they also examine the contexts and power dynamics
that separate deviant and normative behavior. These two distinct
approaches are referred to as the positivist or objective approach and the
constructionist or subjective approach.31 The former is more focused on
the actor—the one engaged in the deviance—while the latter focuses
more on the observer—the person or group that reacts to the deviance.32
1. The Positivist Approach to Deviance
The positivist approach to deviance holds that there are objectively
quantifiable differences that can be properly labeled as deviant. The
positivist or objective definition begins with the assumption that deviant
behavior is definable and fixed, and that certain acts or attributes fall
outside well-known norms of moral behavior.
The positivist perspective relies on three central ideas: empiricism,
objectivism, and determinism.33 “Positivists reject the notion that
definitions of right or wrong are really as relative as constructionist
sociologists of deviance argue.”34 The three central ideas describe
different approaches to positivism. Empiricism describes the relationship
between the scientist and the subject of examination. Empiricists rely on
their senses (and instruments) to provide directly observable or
measurable information about the world they study. Objectivism relates
to the objective or internally consistent characteristics that distinguish
deviant from normal behavior. Determinism refers to the causes of
deviance, such as underlying physical, mental, or environmental
conditions.35 Positivist theories share a common attempt to describe
deviance through explanatory cause and effect relationships.36
Those who use the positivist approach examine not only what causes
30. See generally DAVID DOWNES, PAUL ELLIOTT ROCK & EUGENE MCLAUGHLIN,
UNDERSTANDING DEVIANCE (7th ed. 2016).
31. PETER CONRAD & JOSEPH W. SCHNEIDER, DEVIANCE AND MEDICALIZATION: FROM
BADNESS TO SICKNESS 1 (2010). See also GOODE, supra note 23, at 19–46 (describing positivist
theory of deviance); id. at 49–65 (describing constructionist theories of deviance).
32. One could distinguish the two approaches by looking at the focus of the study and asking
who is considered the “outsider.” In positivist theories, the deviant is considered the outsider, while
in constructionist theories, the judge is considered the outsider. B ECKER, supra note 24, at 1–39
(explaining different theories perspectives).
33. GOODE, supra note 23, at 24.
34. Id. at 25.
35. Id. at 25–26.
36. Id. at 26.
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deviance, but also how to stop or suppress the underlying deviant
behavior.37 A number of specific theories of deviant behavior rely on the
positivist approach to deviance.38 Examples include: the “free will”
school, which holds that deviant behavior can be attributed to a rational
decision favoring pleasure over pain;39 the “social disorganization”
theory (the Chicago School), which holds that deviance resulted from
disintegration of living environments and neighborhoods; 40 and Robert
Merton’s Anomie theory, which holds that deviance resulted from
upheaval in the social structure.41 Anomie theory explained the social
forces that nurtured deviant tendencies and assumed that everyone had
latent deviant tendencies. All the positivist theories have declined in
popularity since their inception; however, Anomie theory resurged in the
late 1990s and 2000s.42
The theories mentioned above examine the factors related to
expressions of deviance. Other positivist theories focus on factors that
inhibited the expression of deviance. Examples include social control
37. CONRAD & SCHNEIDER, supra note 31, at 2 (discussing the positivist area of deviant study).
38. GOODE, supra note 23, at 24–42 (describing, for example, Merton’s anomie or strain theory,
free will or rational choice theory, and social control theory). See generally Robert K. Merton,
Social Structure and Anomie, 3 AM. SOC. REV. 672 (1938) [hereinafter Merton, Social Structure].
39. GOODE, supra note 23, at 27–28; see also Lawrence E. Cohen & Marcus Felson, Social
Change and Crime Rates Trends: A Routine Activity Approach, 44 AM. SOC. REV. 588 (1979)
(discussing the routine activities theory); RONALD V. CLARKE & MARCUS FELSON, ROUTINE
ACTIVITY AND RATIONAL CHOICE (1st paperback prtg. 2004) (1993) (discussing the similarities
and differences between the routine activity theory and rational choice theory). The most widely
supported of the “free-will” theories is described as the routine activities theory, where deviant
behavior results from a “motivated offender, a suitable target, and the absence of a capable
guardian.” GOODE, supra note 23, at 28.
40. GOODE, supra 23, at 29–30; see also Robert E. Parks, The Urban Community as a Spacial
Pattern and a Moral Order, in THE URBAN COMMUNITY (Ernest W. Burgess ed., 1926) (exploring
the composition and development of modern cites and the effect on moral order). This theory was
pronounced dead by Professor Unnever in 1987 but revived in early 1990s by Pfohl and others.
STEPHEN J. PFOHL, IMAGES OF DEVIANCE AND SOCIAL CONTROL: A SOCIOLOGICAL HISTORY
133–69 (1994). A modern conception of disorganization theory includes not only understanding of
collective environmental conditions that impact the likelihood of deviant behavior, but also an
understanding or empathy for the deviant. GOODE, supra note 23, at 31.
41. GOODE, supra note 23, at 31 (quoting ROBERT K. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL
STRUCTURE 132 (1957) [hereinafter MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY]) (“Social structures exert a
definite pressure upon certain persons in the society to engage in non-conforming rather than
conforming conduct.”). See generally Merton, Social Structure, supra note 38 (discussing Merton’s
theory that disruption in social structure causes deviance). Merton defined anomie as “the
disjunction between culturally defined goals and structurally available opportunities.” MERTON,
SOCIAL THEORY, supra.
42. GOODE, supra note 23, at 34–35. See also PHILIPPE BOURGOIS, IN SEARCH OF RESPECT:
SELLING CRACK IN EL BARRIO 326 (2d ed. 2003) (illustrating Anomie theory in the context of drug
dealers); MITCHELL DUNEIER, SIDEWALK 60–62 (1999) (illustrating the same).
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theory, which compares an individual’s preference for conformity to the
prevalence of deviant behavior;43 and self-control theory, which holds
that low self-control and an inability to regulate current behavior
(especially in light of short-term low gains and long-term high costs)
results in deviant behavior. Self-control theory gained popularity with the
introduction of the “general theory of crime” described by Michael
Gottfredson and Travis Hirschi.44
2. The Constructionist Approach to Deviance
Constructionist theories of deviance assume that deviance cannot be
defined without reference to the power structures that define normal.45
Researchers operating under this definition explore issues such as how to
define morality, and how certain groups assert power in a manner that
defines normative or moral behavior.46 A range of theories rely on this
basic framework.47
Constructionists focus on social control—the means through which
society defines and enforces normative behavior.48 Several specific
theories examine the relationship between the deviant behavior and the
entities that judge the behavior as deviant. Interactionist theory (also
known as labeling) rests on three central assumptions: first, people act in
response to things that have meaning to them; second, meaning derives
from interaction with other people; third, meaning changes over time.49
An example is Frank Tannenbaum’s research on youth living in a slum
area, where nearly all boys engaged in behavior they considered normal
but that others considered deviant (fighting, truancy, etc.).50 Tannenbaum
notes that increased efforts by authorities to curtail the deviant behavior
escalated the likelihood that the boys would engage in more serious
criminal acts.51 By labeling the conduct as deviant, the enforcers

43. GOODE, supra note 23, at 37.
44. See generally MICHAEL GOTTFREDSON & TRAVIS HIRSCHI, A GENERAL THEORY OF CRIME
(1990).
45. GOODE, supra note 23, at 49–61; CONRAD & SCHNEIDER, supra note 31, at 2.
46. CONRAD & SCHNEIDER, supra note 31, at 2.
47. GOODE, supra note 23, at 49–61 (describing, among others, the theories of formal and
informal social control, labeling or interactionist theory, and conflict theory). See also BECKER,
supra note 24, at 2–25.
48. GOODE, supra note 23, at 49–52. Within social control, there are formal, semi-formal and
informal modes of communicating the social norms. Id. at 51.
49. Id. at 53.
50. FRANK TANNENBAUM, CRIME AND THE COMMUNITY 3–22 (1938). See also GOODE, supra
note 23, at 53
51. TANNENBAUM, supra note 50, at 15–22 (1938). See also GOODE, supra note 23, at 53.
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separated the subjects from the rest of society, depriving them of social
access to other segments of society, and forcing them into social groups
comprised only of others sharing the same characteristics and norms of
behavior.52
Another branch of Constructionism—conflict theory—examines the
degree of conflict (or lack of consensus) within a given group or society.
Importantly, conflict theory rejects two widely held assumptions related
to the law: first, that law represents a “barometer of the moral and social
thinking” reflecting “the will of the people”;53 and second, that laws
provide equal protection to all members of society. 54 Conflict theorists
hold that only the most powerful receive protection of the law.55
Similarly, feminist theory holds that both society, and by extension the
sociological research of society, hold a specific androcentric
perspective.56
A related theory of controlology focuses on the question of who creates
the rules.57 Michel Foucault’s explanation of Jeremy Bentham’s
Panopticon as an architecture of power stands as a prime example of the
theory of controlology.58 Bentham described the architecture of a prison
he called Panopticon (all-seeing).59 His structure comprised two parts:
one outer circle divided into cells, with each cell facing toward the center
and a central tower in the middle of the outer ring.60 A guard in the tower
would be able to see into the cell of every prisoner, but each prisoner
would not know whether the guard was watching at any given time.61
Each prisoner on the other hand would only have a view of the central
tower.62 Foucault translated Bentham’s physical structure to a metaphor
for the modern surveillance state, where the government, through subtle,
even democratically enacted means, could exercise control and
domination over the people.63
52. EDWIN LEMERT, SOCIAL PATHOLOGY: A SYSTEMATIC APPROACH TO THE THEORY OF
SOCIOPATHIC BEHAVIOR 17 (1951). See also GOODE, supra note 23, at 53.
53. GOODE, supra note 23, at 58.
54. Id. at 58–59.
55. Id. at 58.
56. Id. at 60.
57. Id. at 62.
58. Id.; FOUCAULT, supra note 27, at 200–01; BECKER, supra note 24, at 2–25.
59. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PANOPTICON WRITINGS 35–37 (Miron Božovič ed., 1995).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. FOUCAULT, supra note 27, at 203–07. “Thanks to its mechanism of observation, it gains
efficiency and, in the ability, to penetrate into men’s behavior; knowledge follows the advances of
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3. Applying Theories of Deviance
Is Nic’s behavior deviant? Nic’s behavior in jaywalking is not normal
because it is objectively different from the 70% of the population that
does not jaywalk. How “different” must Nic be from the rest of the
population in order for the difference to matter? In other words, is it
necessary that Nic’s behavior be at least one standard deviation from the
mean?64 Nic’s behavior is unlawful: the municipal ordinance prohibits
jaywalking. But the mere fact that the statute proscribes the conduct does
not make the conduct deviant, at least under sociological definitions.65
The publication of the names of violators in the newspaper presents a
mechanism for publication of information about Nic’s conduct, and
accordingly, a mechanism of social control (if Nic is concerned about
negative consequences if others discover his transgression).
Note that Nic may be acting rationally and in a manner approved by
society. He may have engaged in a careful cost-benefit analysis. The
amount of the fine and Nic’s billable rate demonstrate both the cost of
compliance and non-compliance. Here, the cost of compliance was 1/6 of
$300, or $50, because Nic would have lost ten minutes of billable time.
Compliance—waiting for the light to change—would have taken only
two minutes, but those two minutes had the value of ten minutes because
of Nic’s schedule. The benefit of compliance was avoiding the fine of
$25 and avoiding the shame of having his name in the paper. Moreover,
Nic may have weighed the near certain probability of losing $50 in
billable time against the probability of being caught and the penalty of
the $25 fine. For Nic, the choice to jaywalk seems like an economically
favorable and rational decision.
Missing from the scenario was the critical fact that would define Nic’s
behavior as deviant: How would other members of the community treat
Nic if they discovered his behavior? Maybe the community would respect
his cost-benefit analysis. Others in society might respect and value his
power, discovering new objects of knowledge over all the surfaces on which power is exercised.”
Id. at 204.
64. In statistics, standard deviation is a way to measure the degree of variance within a data set.
When analyzing differences within a sample or a population, members of the group that are
distinguished from 68% can be said to lie “one standard deviation from the mean.” A distinction
from 95% of the population are two standard deviations from the mean.
65. Other scholars have described illegal behavior as “formally” deviant simply because it is
against the law. For example, Professor Mark Edwards defines “deviant” as contrary to formal law.
Thus, “[t]o the extent regulators’ enforcement decisions do not adhere to enforcement of the formal
law—that is, to the extent they are formally ‘deviant’—we may ask . . . what is guiding their
decision-making.” Mark Edwards, Law and the Parameters of Acceptable Deviance, 97 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 49, 51 (2006).
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rational analysis of the costs and benefits of his choice to comply with
the law or not. What if everyone in the community of Middletown
jaywalks—as suggested by the 50% rate before the cameras were
installed? Does the degree to which Nic’s behavior differs from the norm
matter (i.e., whether jaywalking is somewhat unusual or highly unusual
within the community)? What if local law enforcement has decided either
individually or collectively not to enforce the jaywalking provision? If
jaywalking were under-enforced, then Nic would face an even lower
probability of suffering the negative consequences of discovery. 66 In
some of these scenarios, Nic’s behavior might not be deviant at all.
Nic may have found a different way to analyze the value of his decision
to jaywalk. Apart from the economic value of his decision, Nic’s choice
may provide social value. Often people with similar traits will form
relationships or social groups. In our example, it is possible Nic might
see Andi again, and through their shared experience, form a friendship.
In sum, Nic (or Andi) may find benefit from disclosing his experiences
within the insular group. Conversely, without disclosing his experiences,
he may be denied entry to the group since the behavior provides a
common bond.
Aside from the economic cost (the fine), there may be additional social
costs to Nic’s behavior if he were met with scorn from other members of
the community. The real social cost for Nic derives from the effect of
publication in the Police Blotter. As a lawyer, Nic may lose reputational
value or he may be ostracized or shamed by other members of society for
his failure to respect the law. In analyzing the potential social cost, Nic
should consider the degree of harm as well as the probability of the harm.
Thus, the probability of being caught would be of paramount concern.
Nic should consider the surveillance cameras because their presence
increases the probability of being caught.
Depending on the theory of deviance applied, sociologists might
examine very different questions regarding Nic’s deviance (assuming his
behavior is deviant). Positivists would focus on what separates Nic from
the other non-deviant members of the community. How is he different?
What are the reasons for Nic’s behavior—why did he do it? They might
look to Nic’s propensity for risk. They might examine Nic’s decision in
light of economic cost and benefits. Does he have a nonconformist
attitude? Is the deviant behavior the product of his early childhood
environment? Constructivists might examine questions about the origins
of the rule itself. Who created the rule? Why doesn’t the law create a
66. Professor Mark Edwards examined the issue of discretionary enforcement. See generally
Edwards, supra note 65.
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preference for pedestrians? What effect did the trucking industry have on
the passage of the jaywalking ordinance? Why was the ordinance underenforced? Did the installation of the cameras serve as a mechanism of
social control?
This example demonstrates the importance of context in the
examination of deviance. The definition of the difference is important, as
is the reaction of others and the ensuing negative effect or consequence.
In some contexts, it is fairly easy to both define the type of proscribed
behavior and to predict the negative consequence.67 But sometimes there
are errors in defining deviance.
C. Historical Examples of Deviance
One problem with defining deviance is the poor track record of getting
it right. Defining normal is problematic because the definition often relies
on power relationships. For example, certain interests may benefit from
a description of normal that favors their own characteristics. Behaviors
that were considered deviant—and illegal—even a few years ago, are
considered normal today. This is particularly true in the areas of mental
health, sexual tendencies and behaviors, and political views. As noted
above, the definition of deviance does not discriminate among behaviors,
beliefs, characteristics, or even disease. In defining deviance, the
questions are whether there is a recognizable difference, and whether the
normative or dominant group would impose negative consequences that
stem from that difference.
1. Refining Definitions of Normal
Defining difference can be difficult. For example, with respect to
mental functioning, classifications of disease or disorder may be modified
so that the same individual, once classified as deviant, could later be
classified as non-deviant. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (DSM) defines characteristics of mental disorders and
their statistical prevalence.68 The DSM is updated periodically, and in
some circumstances, the same patient with the same characteristics and
symptoms may move in or out of a classification of disorder with the
publication of the new edition of the DSM. For example, the DSM-5
67. For example, sexual relationships between adults and children are both proscribed and
normatively condemned, and this is the correct result.
68. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV]. The American Psychiatric Association recently
published a new edition. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-5].
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refined the definition of autism spectrum disorder.69 Many patients who
met the guidelines under the DSM-IV (1994) did not meet the guidelines
under the DSM-5 (2013).70 Neither the patient nor the behaviors changed,
but the definition of the disorder—of the deviance—changed.
As noted above, the question of whether a difference causes a negative
consequence can be contextual. A condition or set of behaviors may be
viewed as a disease or disability in one context, and yet in another
context, the same condition can be viewed as a competitive advantage.71
For example, media articles have drawn attention to employers’ search
for candidates with Asperger’s syndrome (a milder form of autism)72 for
certain types of jobs.73 In The Big Short, author Michael Lewis profiled
Michael Burry, an investment banker who predicted the 2008 mortgage
crisis.74 Burry credited his success to Asperger’s syndrome, stating “only
someone who has Asperger’s would read a subprime mortgage bond
prospectus.”75 A person might be reticent to disclose a mental health
69. Compare DSM-IV, supra note 68, at 66–71, 75–77 (defining impaired social interaction
and a restricted repertoire of interests as essential features of autism spectrum disorder), with DSM5, supra note 68, at 50–59 (defining in greater detail the diagnostic criteria of autism spectrum
disorder, with several subtypes, specifications, and levels of severity).
70. Ferris Jabr, Redefining Autism: Will New DSM-5 Criteria for ASD Exclude Some People?,
AM. SCI. (Jan. 30, 2012), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/autism-new-criteria/ [https://
perma.cc/6LUS-FPDZ]; Amy S.F. Lutz, You Do Not Have Asperger’s: What Psychiatry’s New
Diagnostic Manual Means for People on the Autism Spectrum, SLATE (May 22, 2013, 2:00 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/medical_examiner/2013/05/autism_spectrum_d
iagnoses_the_dsm_5_eliminates_asperger_s_and_pdd_nos.html [https://perma.cc/XLP9-B3YK];
James Mcpartland, Brian Reichow & Fred Volkmar, Sensitivity and Specificity of Proposed DSM5 Criteria for Autism Spectrum Disorder, 51 J. AM. ACAD. OF CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY
368 (2012) (applying new DSM-5 criteria for ASD to a sample of 933 participants, some with a
DSM-IV ASD diagnosis and some without, and finding 60.6 percent of those with ASD diagnosis
under DSM-IV met DSM-5 criteria, and 94.9 percent of non-ASD participants were excluded under
DSM-5 criteria).
71. See, e.g., Lutz, supra note 70 (noting “it’s almost cool to have Asperger’s”); see also
Benjamin Wallace, Are You On It?, N.Y. MAGAZINE (Oct. 28, 2012), http://nymag.com/news/
features/autism-spectrum-2012-11/ [https://perma.cc/D2Y2-68WR] (discussing the prevalence of
discussion about who is and who is not on the autism spectrum).
72. The DSM-IV classified Asperger’s Disorder (also known as Asperger’s Syndrome) as a
disorder distinct from autism. The DSM-5 replaced Asperger’s Disorder and other developmental
disorders with a blanket diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder (ASD). See DSM-IV, supra note
68; DSM-5, supra note 68 (comparing Asperger Disorder as it relates to the autism spectrum).
73. Reuters, Autism in the Workplace: Companies Seek Out Autistic Workers to Fuel Innovation
with Neurological Diversity, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (June 4, 2013, 2:25 PM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/life-style/health/companies-seek-autistic-workers-fuel-innovationarticle-1.1362853 [https://perma.cc/AKZ2-SHK8].
74. See generally MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE (2010).
75. Daniel
Gross,
Eve
of
Destruction,
N.Y. TIMES
(Apr.
18,
2010)
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/18/books/review/Gross-t.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. [https://
perma.cc/FA6X-2TC9].
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diagnosis—unless that diagnosis is recognized as an advantage. But to
gain the advantage, the individual must be able to disclose the
information in a contextually appropriate manner.
2. Revising Formal Definitions of Deviance
In some contexts, the label of deviance is applied to behavior that may
be relatively common. Sexual tendencies and preferences comprise a
large part of the sociological literature on deviance,76 and “[s]exually
unconventional behavior remains a central topic of discussion in most
courses on deviance.”77
The legal status of sexual behavior can change rapidly, as evidenced
by the Supreme Court’s decisions on consensual sodomy. In 1986, the
Court decided Bowers v. Hardwick and upheld the constitutionality of a
Georgia statute that criminalized sodomy.78 Justice White, writing for the
5-4 majority, relied on the degree to which the conduct violated norms,
referencing the number of states with laws similar to Georgia’s and the
long tradition of proscribing such conduct. Justice White wrote:
Proscriptions against [consensual sodomy] have ancient roots. Sodomy
was a criminal offense at common law and was forbidden by the laws
of the original [thirteen] States when they ratified the Bill of Rights. In
1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, all but [five] of
the [thirty-seven] States in the Union had criminal sodomy laws.79

Justice Powell underscored the point, noting that the Georgia statute
authorized a penalty of up to twenty years in prison for engaging in “a
single act of consensual sodomy, even in the private setting of a home.”80
Seventeen years later, in 2003, the Court overruled Bowers in
Lawrence v. Texas,81 and invalidated Texas’s law against consensual
sodomy.82 Though rarely enforced, many states had similar provisions
criminalizing sexual acts between consenting adults,83 and several states
76. GOODE, supra note 23, at 197.
77. Id.
78. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
79. Id. at 192–93 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).
80. Id. at 197–98 (Powell, J., concurring) (noting that such a penalty would raise Eighth
Amendment concerns, an issue not raised in the case because there had not been a conviction).
81. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
82. The Texas law proscribes oral or anal sex between consenting adults. TEX. PENAL CODE §
21.01 (2005) and TEX. PENAL CODE § 21.06 (1994). The Georgia statute in Bowers was nearly
identical to the Texas statute in Lawrence. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (2019).
83. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.00(2) (McKinney 1996) (defining “deviate sexual
intercourse”); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.38 (McKinney 1965) (repealed 2001), declared
unconstitutional by People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1980) (defining a misdemeanor
offense of consensual sodomy).
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still have statutes prohibiting sexual conduct between consenting adults,
although these statutes were effectively repealed by Lawrence.84
Perhaps the literature on deviance is dominated by sexuality because
there is simultaneously a wide diversity of behavior and a strong social
pressure to conform to a narrow range of behaviors. Despite the illegal
labels applied to certain sexual behaviors, empirical research
demonstrated that proscribed behaviors and activities were relatively
common. For example, the well-known Kinsey Reports in 1948 and 1953
demonstrated an array and prevalence of sexual conduct at odds with the
legal status of the same sexual behaviors at that time.85 The subject matter
of the Kinsey research—human sexuality—was considered taboo and
researchers received negative publicity because of the norm-breaking,
deviant nature of the research.86 Just as the Kinsey Reports reflected a
chasm between prevalent sexual activities and social norms, the reaction
to the Kinsey Reports demonstrated a dramatic divide: the Reports were
simultaneously a popular success (the first volume sold more than
200,000 copies in the first two months) and the subject of vehement
criticism.87 Recent research on sexual behavior shows a high percentage
of the population engaging in a wide range of sexual activities, suggesting
that the behavior proscribed by the statutes at issue in Bowers and
Lawrence was normal, even in states where similar (but unenforceable)
statutes exist today.88

84. See, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:89 (2018) (punishing “unnatural carnal copulation” with a
potential prison sentence of five years “with or without hard labor”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 131408 (2019) (“A married person who has sexual intercourse with another than his or her spouse,
and an unmarried person who has sexual intercourse with a married person not his or her spouse,
commits adultery and is guilty of a class 3 misdemeanor. When the act is committed between parties
only one of whom is married, both shall be punished.”).
85. ALFRED KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 35–40 (Ind. Univ. Press
1998) (1948); ALFRED KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN FEMALE 3–6 (Ind. Univ.
Press 1998) (1953).
86. Kinsey’s research received both favorable and unfavorable reviews. One negative reaction
called the Kinsey Report “an assault on the family as a basic unit of society, a negation of moral
law, and a celebration of licentiousness.” Erdman Palmore, Published Reactions to the Kinsey
Report, 31 SOC. FORCES, Dec. 1952, at 165, 165–66.
87. Regina Markell Morantz, The Scientist as Sex Crusader: Alfred C. Kinsey and American
Culture, 29 AM. Q., Winter 1977, at 555, 564–65, 575. Morantz notes that the Female Report led
to a Congressional call for the Postmaster General to bar the Report from the mail, questions about
financial support of Kinsey research, and accusations that Kinsey was aiding communism. Id. at
575.
88. Debby Herbenick et al., Sexual Diversity in the United States: Results from a Nationally
Representative Probability Sample of Adult Women and Men (July 20, 2017), https://www.
ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5519052/ [https://perma.cc/H5RW-GKAG]. More than 50% of
respondents reported engaging in masturbation, vaginal sex, oral sex, sending and receiving digital
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3. Informal Deviance
The example of sexual activities shows that deviance can be formally
defined by law. Other examples show changes in what is considered
normal, even in the absence of formal definitions. Historically, mainstream social norms disapproved of tattoos, yet the same tattoos
simultaneously provided the owner with the advantage of access and
acceptance into a range of subcultures. A specific tattoo might signify
service in a specific military unit or affiliation with a gang or sports team.
The worlds of art and music present a constant parade of concepts and
ideas that were scorned or censored at one time, only to become
celebrated later. For example, Edouard Manet’s Olimpia generated
controversy not for the depiction of nudity, but for the model’s outward
stare, a gaze that broke the hierarchical barrier between subject and
viewer.89 The Surrealist and Dada movements are noted for the
intentional rejection of accepted norms and for creating a new definition
of art that included social commentary as a part of the artistic endeavor.90
Performance art by Marina Abramovic and Vito Acconci pushed
boundaries of what is acceptable in the interaction between artist and
patron, often leaving lasting impressions on those witnessing the
exhibition.91 In a poignant piece from 1969, Acconci selected a random
person to follow, at least until the subject entered a private space.92
These examples show that the disclosure of information is highly
contextual. The same information disclosed to one person might lead to
nude images, reading erotic stories, and watching explicit videos.
89. Charles Bernheimer, Manet’s Olympia: The Figuration of Scandal, 10 POETICS TODAY,
Summer 1989, at 255, 255–56.
90. Andre Breton defined surrealism as “pure psychic automatism, by which one proposes to
express, either verbally, in writing, or by any other manner, the real functioning of thought.
Dictation of thought in the absence of all control exercised by reason, outside of all aesthetic and
moral preoccupation.” ANDRÉ BRETON, MANIFESTOES OF SURREALISM 26 (Richard Seaver &
Helen R. Lane trans., Univ. Mich. Press 1946) (1924). The Tate Museum describes Surrealism as
“a twentieth century literary, philosophical an artistic movement that explored the workings of the
mind, championing the irrational, the poetic and the revolutionary. Surrealism aimed to
revolutionize human experience, rejecting a rational vision of life in favor or one that asserted the
value of the unconscious and dreams.” Surrealism – Art Term, TATE MUSEUM,
https://www.tate.org.uk/art/art-terms/s/surrealism [https://perma.cc/8W6B-KF44].
91. Il Sapere, Marina Abramovic on Performing ‘Rhythm O’ 1974 (May 29, 2017),
https://www. youtube.com/watch?v=kijKz3JzoD4 [https://perma.cc/AEB6-XXA6] (showing the
artist standing still and inviting the audience to do whatever they wanted to her using any of the 72
available objects, which included a feather boa, scissors, honey, a metal bar and a gun loaded with
a single bullet); see also Marina Abramovic, Rhythm O (1974), https://www.guggenheim.
org/artwork/5177 [https://perma.cc/T27D-KU8Y] (memorializing Rhythm O).
92. Vito Acconci, Following Piece (1969), https://www.metmuseum.org/art/collection/
search/283737 [https://perma.cc/FPJ5-Y94R].
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a fulfilling relationship; while that same information, revealed to another
group, could subject the individual to criminal penalties. In the art world,
expressing the same idea to two different groups might generate different
results, therefore an individual must reveal information to a specific
individual or small group of individuals to achieve personal fulfillment.
For example, if expressed within an avant-garde group of progressive
thinkers, a new idea might generate laudatory acceptance while
simultaneously generating rejection or scorn from a more established art
world. These examples demonstrate that behaviors that might be normal
can nonetheless be deviant because of the negative consequences of
disclosure thereby reinforcing the importance of discreet and contextual
disclosure of information related to the deviant activities.
4. Political Deviance
The label of deviant may also apply to the expression of political
views. The McCarthy Era investigations and prosecutions provide
examples of severe repercussions for the expression of minority political
views.93 The actions of the FBI in infiltrating and subverting
organizations through CONINTELPRO exemplify how the use of
government authority can suppress deviant political views and minority
political groups.94 Moreover, the negative characterization of different
political views (such as those expressed by demonstrators at Occupy Wall
Street) or religious beliefs (such as Muslim communities) remains today,
as does the effort to infiltrate and undermine them.95 Thus, even
behaviors or characteristics that are protected by the Constitution may
nonetheless be deviant where they are different and where they result in
negative consequences.
D. Deviance and Information Transfer
In relation to deviance, the manner and extent of disclosure of
information is critical because the question of who receives information
often determines whether the behavior or characteristic is defined as
deviant. Deviant behaviors or characteristics can have both a conjunctive
and a disjunctive effect on relationships with others. Among people in the
93. See, e.g., McCarran Internal Security Act, Pub. L. No. 81-831, 64 Stat. 987 (1950)
(requiring, among other actions, registration with the Subversive Activities Control Board).
94. From 1956 to 1971, the Federal Bureau of Investigation engaged in systematic efforts to
infiltrate, discredit and disrupt organizations it deemed to be subversive. The Counter Intelligence
Program became known as CONINTELPRO. FBI RECORDS: THE VAULT, FED. BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, https://vault.fbi.gov/cointel-pro [https://perma.cc/M8ML-WTAF].
95. See, e.g., Sahar Aziz, Policing Terrorists in the Community, 5 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J.
147 (2014) (describing the efforts of the federal government to infiltrate Muslim communities to
bolster prosecutions).

88

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 51

same insular group, the behavior or characteristic is the thing that brings
people together. But that same characteristic or behavior classifies an
individual as deviant in the eyes of other individuals or groups. The
definition and application of deviance depends, therefore, on a dynamic
relationship between the actor and the observer. The characterization of
an individual or a group as deviant matters, and it matters a lot, because
the deviant label may trigger negative consequences, such as the use of
surveillance and other mechanisms of suppression, intimidation, and
social control.
In sum, deviance is highly contextual. The definition of what is deviant
can depend on the opinion of experts, it may or may not reflect the
common behaviors of the members of the community, and it may extend
to political or religious views, which should be protected by the
Constitution. The law is relevant to, but not dispositive of, a definition of
deviance.
II. DEVIANCE AND THE NOTHING TO HIDE ARGUMENT
“I don’t mind Verizon turning over records to the government if the
government is going to make sure that they try to match up a known
terrorist phone with somebody in the United States. I don’t think you’re
talking to the terrorists. I know you’re not. I know I’m not. So we don’t
have anything to worry about.”96

Many Americans responded to revelations from Edward Snowden
about the NSA’s surveillance activities with a collective “so what.” 97 A
poll in early 2019 found Americans unmoved by the advancing
implementation of facial recognition technologies.98 People who
96. Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) when asked about NSA collection of user phone records. Tal
Kopan, Lindsey Graham ‘Glad’ NSA Tracking Phones, POLITICO (June 6, 2013, 9:39 AM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2013/06/lindsey-graham-nsa-tracking-phones-92330.html [https://
perma.cc/DM3X-GKMQ].
97. A poll by the Pew Research Center found that 56 percent of Americans found it “acceptable”
for the NSA to obtain secret orders to track phone calls of Americans. Pew Research Center for the
People and the Press, Majority Views NSA Phone Tracking as Acceptable Anti-terror Tactic (June
10,
2013),
http://www.people-press.org/2013/06/10/majority-views-nsa-phone-tracking-asacceptable-anti-terror-tactic/ [https://perma.cc/ARE8-DN2P]. Interestingly, the same poll found
while that all ages expressed a preference for security over privacy, a higher number of younger
respondents expressed a preference for privacy concerns (45% of 18-29 year-olds preferred
privacy) as compared with older respondents (28% of 50-64 year-olds preferred privacy). See also
James B. Rule, The Price of the Panopticon, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2013, at A25; Adam Nagourney,
In U.S., News of Surveillance Effort Is Met With Some Concern But Little Surprise, N.Y. TIMES,
June 8, 2013, at A12 (discussing how the federal government is monitoring and gathering
individuals’ phone calls and online activities).
98. A survey by the Center for Data Innovation found only 26% of respondents favored strict
limitations on the use of facial recognition technology. Daniel Castro & Michael McLaughlin,
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responded in this way may have bought in to the nothing to hide
argument.99 The weak version of the argument holds that an individual
has nothing to fear from increased surveillance and gathering of
information if the individual has done nothing wrong, and thus has
nothing to hide. A stronger form of the nothing to hide argument holds
that the individuals in a society should be willing to trade control over
their individual information in return for increased security through the
elimination or drastic reduction of the risk of a future harm (such as a
terrorist attack).100
The stronger version of the nothing to hide argument is powerful for
several reasons. It pits a low-impact, individual, and incremental risk of
harm—the loss of privacy—against a high-impact, collective, and
immediate risk of harm—the terrorist attack.101 The argument includes
critical and hidden assumptions: that the security threat is real and
imminent and preventable, and that the privacy-reducing measures will
prevent the security threat.102 The argument also assumes the security
Survey: Few Americans Want Government to Limit Use of Facial Recognition Technology,
Particularly for Public Safety or Airport Screening, CENT. FOR DATA INNOVATION (Jan. 7, 2019),
https://www.datainnovation.org/2019/01/survey-few-americans-want-government-to-limit-useof-facial-recognition-technology-particularly-for-public-safety-or-airport-screening/
[https://perma.cc/MTU5-JUCT].
99. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE: THE FALSE TRADEOFF BETWEEN PRIVACY AND
SECURITY (2011) [hereinafter SOLOVE, FALSE TRADEOFF]; Daniel J. Solove, “I’ve Got Nothing to
Hide” and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 745, 748–53 (2007)
[hereinafter Solove, Misunderstandings of Privacy].
100. Solove, Misunderstandings of Privacy, supra note 99, at 748–53.
101. Id.
102. In this way the argument is similar to the “ticking time bomb” scenario used to defend the
use of torture. Henry Shue, Torture in Dreamland: Disposing of the Ticking Bomb, 37 CASE
WESTERN RES. J. INT’L L. 231, 234–35 (2005); David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking
Bomb, in INTERVENTION, TERRORISM AND TORTURE: CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO JUST
WAR THEORY 249, 249–62 (Steven Lee ed., 2007); see, e.g., Steve Benen, What Kind of
Hypothetical Is That?, THE WASH. MONTHLY, January 16, 2009, http://www.
washingtonmonthly.com/archives/individual/2009_01/016465.php
[https://perma.cc/QB8YN4F6] (recounting the exchange between Eric Holder and Sen. John Cornyn over the ticking time
bomb scenario). Though philosophers had put the argument to rest years ago, like a pesky garden
weed, the “ticking time bomb” scenario reappeared recently. Conor Friedersdorf, Torture, Ticking
Time Bombs, and Waterboarding Americans, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 30, 2014),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/04/the-tortured-logic-of-the-ticking-time-bombscenario/361345/ [https://perma.cc/M88G-NHX4]; Andrew McCarthy, Sarah Palin on Baptism,
Waterboarding . . . and ‘Torture’, NAT’L REV. (Apr. 28, 2014), http://www.nationalreview.com/
corner/376733/sarah-palin-baptism-waterboarding-and-torture-andrew-c-mccarthy [https://perma.
cc/ZHL8-BGUA]. The “ticking time bomb” scenario justifies torture on a utilitarian basis by
making at least five and up to ten assumptions that could never be drawn in reality. Like the ticking
time bomb scenario, the security for privacy scenario assumes as certain many questions that would
never be known in reality. In shorthand, the justification for the trade of privacy for security is the
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threat will occur unless the privacy-reducing measures are implemented.
These hidden assumptions shift the burden to those questioning the
measures, who must prove that no dramatic security breach would occur
if privacy were left intact. In addition, the argument presumes that
individuals in a society should not have a right to hide information,
especially where that information may be evidence of the individual’s
deviance.
As explained below, the nothing to hide argument has been effectively
rebutted. One of the central problems with the argument concerns the
framing of the issue: when a vague interest in privacy is weighed against
a concrete harm of a terrorist action, it is very difficult for privacy to
prevail.103 Privacy debates center around the justification (or lack
thereof) for the capture, disclosure, or dissemination of information.
When the concept of privacy is fully explained, however, the harms
associated with a loss of privacy become more apparent, more immediate,
and more tangible. This robust understanding of privacy can be explained
by looking at deviance. If there were something to hide, what would it
be? Most likely, it would be something deviant.
A. The Nothing to Hide Argument
The nothing to hide argument is a frequent and powerful response
when privacy concerns are implicated by the release and distribution of
information, raising issues about who gives consent and who has control
over sensitive personal information. Professor Daniel Solove succinctly
described the nothing to hide argument:
The argument that no privacy problem exists if a person has nothing to
hide is frequently made in connection with many privacy issues. When
the government engages in surveillance, many people believe that there
is no threat to privacy unless the government uncovers unlawful
activity, in which case a person has no legitimate justification to claim
that it remain private. . . . In its most compelling form, it is an argument
assurance that the trade will work—a great unknown. While interesting and perhaps worthy of a
lengthier discussion, this argument is not the one I follow in this paper.
103. The framing heuristic describes a common error in thinking, where people change their
risk tolerance when a decision is framed in terms of a loss rather than a gain. See Daniel Kahneman
& Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263,
263–64 (1979) (analyzing decision making through probability and certainty by an alternative
model called the prospect theory); Daniel Kahneman, Reference Points, Anchors, Norms, and
Mixed Feelings, 51 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 296, 297–98 (1992).
See also Chris Guthrie, Prospect Theory, Risk Preference, and the Law, 97 N.W. U. L. REV. 1115,
1116 (2003). See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW 13, 20–24 (2012)
(discussing how the mind incorporates heuristic thinking); MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK 14–16,
23 (2005) (discussing how instincts compete with other interests and emotions).
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that the privacy interest is generally minimal to trivial, thus making the
balance against security concerns a foreordained victory for security.104

Solove notes two versions of the nothing to hide argument: the weak
and the strong. The weak version can often be refuted with a few
questions into an individual’s personal preferences or medical history. 105
The strong version, however, is more challenging. The strong version
includes an analysis of the type of data being collected, the entities to
whom the information is revealed (in some cases the entity is a computer
program and no human eye sees the information), and the probability that
the information would be shared with someone outside of those permitted
access to the information.106 In addition, the strong version of the
argument includes a comparison of the value of the privacy interest
against the interest in security. Solove summarizes the strong version of
the nothing to hide argument as follows:
NSA surveillance, data mining, or other government informationgathering programs will result in the disclosure of particular pieces of
information to a few government officials, or perhaps only to
government computers. This very limited disclosure of the particular
information involved is not likely to be threatening to the privacy of
law-abiding citizens. Only those who are engaged in illegal activities
have a reason to hide this information. Although there may be some
cases in which the information might be sensitive or embarrassing to
law-abiding citizens, the limited disclosure lessens the threat to privacy.
Moreover, the security interest in detecting, investigating, and
preventing terrorist attacks is very high and outweighs whatever
minimal107 or moderate privacy interests law-abiding citizens may have
in these particular pieces of information.108

Solove admits that “[u]nder such a balancing scheme, it is quite
difficult for privacy to prevail.”109
B. Solove’s Rebuttal of the Nothing to Hide Argument
Solove’s elegant defense of privacy begins with a clarification of the
104. Solove, Misunderstandings of Privacy, supra note 99, at 746–47.
105. Solove quotes David Flaherty: “There is no sentient human being in the Western world
who has little or no regard for his or her personal privacy; those who would attempt such claims
cannot withstand even a few minutes’ questioning about intimate aspects of their lives without
capitulating to the intrusiveness of certain subject matters.” Id. at 751 (quoting David H. Flaherty,
Visions of Privacy: Past, Present, and Future, in VISIONS OF PRIVACY: POLICY CHOICES FOR THE
DIGITAL AGE 19, 31 (Colin J. Bennett & Rebecca Grant eds., 1999)).
106. Solove, Misunderstandings of Privacy, supra note 99, at 751–53.
107. Id. at 753.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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term privacy.110 Privacy, according to Solove, should be understood as a
“set of family resemblances,” or as a “plurality of different things that do
not share one element in common but . . . bear a resemblance to each
other.”111 According to Solove,
[p]rivacy, then, is not the trumpeting of the individual against society’s
interests, but the protection of the individual based on society’s own
norms and values. Privacy is not simply a way to extricate individuals
from social control, as it is itself a form of social control that emerges
from a society’s norms. It is not an external restraint on society, but is
in fact an internal dimension of society. Therefore, privacy has a social
value. Even when it protects the individual, it does so for the sake of
society. It thus should not be weighed as an individual right against the
greater social good.112

Solove argues that “privacy involves protecting against a plurality of
different harms or problems” and therefore, “the value of privacy is
different depending upon which particular problem or harm is being
protected.”113 Further, Solove’s “Taxonomy of Privacy” distinguishes
different types of interests covered by the concept of privacy, some
related to the acquisition of information, and some related to the
dissemination of information.114
In sum, Solove rebuts the nothing to hide argument with two key
moves. First, he exposes the framing effect. Second, he adopts an
expansive definition of privacy. The nothing to hide argument derives its
power from framing the issue as limited to the simple disclosure of
personal information.115 In contrast, Solove casts a much wider net,
arguing that the problem involves much more than the potential effect on
110. Id. at 755. See JULIE C. INNESS, PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND ISOLATION 56 (1992)
(explaining the concept of privacy as intimate information, access and decisions). See also Samuel
D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193 (1890) (discussing
privacy as the “right to be left alone); Daniel Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV.
1087, 1095–99 (2002) [hereinafter Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy] (examining the different
theories of privacy, including the “right to be left alone” and “secrecy”).
111. Solove, Misunderstandings of Privacy, supra note 99, at 755; see also Solove,
Conceptualizing Privacy, supra note 110, at 1099–1124 (exploring the abstract theories of privacy
and conceptualizing these theories to help demonstrate their complexities and limits).
112. Solove, Misunderstandings of Privacy, supra note 99, at 763.
113. Id.
114. Solove’s categories are: Information Collection, Information Processing, Information
Dissemination, and Invasion. Each category has a number of related infractions. Daniel Solove, A
Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 489 (2006) [hereinafter Solove, Taxonomy of
Privacy]; Solove, Misunderstandings of Privacy, supra note 99, at 757–59; see also Solove,
Conceptualizing Privacy, supra note 110, at 1095–99 (explaining the methods in which we
conceptualize privacy).
115. Solove, Misunderstandings of Privacy, supra note 99, at 767.
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an individual. “The key misunderstanding is that the nothing to hide
argument views privacy in a particular way—as a form of secrecy, as the
right to hide things.”116 Privacy violations—of the sort Solove
describes—do not result in catastrophic and sudden injuries.117 Rather,
the harm emerges gradually. Solove concludes that “the balancing of
privacy interests against security interests takes place in a manner that
severely shortchanges the privacy interest while inflating the security
interests.”118
C. Hidden Privacy Concerns
Despite the valiant efforts of Professor Solove, the nothing to hide
argument remains a common refrain. Part of the problem, as Solove
explained, is that privacy concerns remain hidden, and it is difficult to
protect or even define something that is obscured. In recent cases, courts
have struggled to define and protect hidden privacy concerns.
1. Nothing to Hide in Carpenter v. United States
Evidence of the nothing to hide argument can be seen in the interplay
between the majority opinion and the dissenting opinions in Carpenter v.
United States.119 Specifically, the dissenting opinions of Justice Kennedy
and Justice Gorsuch reflected the gist of the nothing to hide argument.
The majority opinion of Justice Roberts rebutted the dissenters by
reliance on contextual privacy.
In his dissent, Justice Kennedy stated that “[a] person’s movements are
not particularly private,”120 and contended that “[m]illions of Americans
share their location on a daily basis, whether by using a variety of
location-based services on their phones, or by sharing their location with
friends and the public at large via social media.”121 Justice Gorsuch asked
why “someone’s location when using a cell phone” is worthy of
protection.122 Both Justice Kennedy and Justice Gorsuch argued that this
type of information is not sufficiently private to meet the “reasonable
expectation of privacy” test.123

116. Id. at 767–68.
117. Id. at 770.
118. Id. at 772.
119. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
120. Id. at 2242 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 2262 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
123. See generally id. at 2242–46 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 2261–72 (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting).
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The arguments of the respective Justices are slightly different. Justice
Kennedy relied on the third-party doctrine articulated in Miller v. United
States124 and Smith v. Maryland.125 He argued that the cell site location
information at issue in Carpenter was less sensitive than the financial
records and telephone records disclosed in Miller and Smith.126 Since
there was no search in the disclosure of financial and telephone records,
there could be no search in the disclosure of CSLI.
Justice Gorsuch, on the other hand, presented a hypothetical case for
overruling the precedents of Smith and Miller.127 Justice Gorsuch
explained the lack of privacy under the third-party doctrine:
Can the government demand a copy of all your e-mails from Google or
Microsoft without implicating your Fourth Amendment rights? Can it
secure your DNA from 23andMe without a warrant or probable cause?
Smith and Miller say yes it can—at least without running afoul of Katz.
But that result strikes most lawyers and judges—me included—as
pretty unlikely. . . . People often do reasonably expect that information
they entrust to third parties, especially information subject to
confidentiality agreements, will be kept private.128

Thus, Justice Gorsuch agreed that the transfer of sensitive information
does matter and that confidential information should be kept private.
The majority opinion in Carpenter responded to the concerns
articulated by the dissenters. Justice Roberts explained that the cell site
location information must be examined contextually. It’s not about where
a person was while making a single phone call; rather, the CSLI provided
a “detailed chronicle” that exposed “privacy concerns.”129
Justice Gorsuch wonders why “someone’s location when using a
phone” is sensitive, and Justice Kennedy assumes that a person’s
discrete movements are “not particularly private.” Yet this case is not
about “using a phone” or a person’s movement at a particular time. It is
about a detailed chronicle of a person’s physical presence compiled
every day, every moment, over several years. Such a chronicle
124. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–44 (1976) (finding no reasonable expectation
of privacy in banking records voluntarily disclosed to financial institutions).
125. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979) (finding no expectation of privacy in
phone numbers dialed because the information was transmitted voluntarily to the telephone
company).
126. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2242 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
127. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2261–63, 2265–66 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
128. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2263–64 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). It is unclear whether Justice
Gorsuch knew at the time he wrote the opinion that, in fact, the government had searched private
commercial DNA databases without consent or a warrant or probable cause. See generally Haag,
supra note 15.
129. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
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implicates privacy concerns far beyond those considered in Smith and
Miller.130

The pervasive quality and sheer quantity of CSLI—a person’s location
“compiled . . . every moment, over several years”—transforms a simple
fact of where a person was at a specific time into an unreasonable
intrusion into private life.131
The initial attractiveness of the nothing to hide argument stems from a
faulty proposition that privacy is about hiding things, and more
specifically, that privacy is concerned with hiding wrong things. The
majority opinion recognizes that privacy concerns and the protections of
the Fourth Amendment are broader than simply protecting “persons,
houses, papers and effects.”132 By examining the context of the disclosure
of information, the Carpenter majority recognized the fallacy of the
nothing to hide argument.
2. Consent and Disclosure in Rosenbach v. Six Flags
Two recent decisions expanded the notion of a privacy interest in
“mere” disclosure. In Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entertainment
Corporation, the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the denial of defendant’s
motion to dismiss a claim under the Illinois Biometric Information
Protection Act (BIPA).133 In a parallel class action case, Patel v.
Facebook, Inc.,134 the District Court for the Northern District of
California decided a similar motion under the BIPA.135
The Rosenbach court explained the harm as follows:
The act vests in individuals the right to control their biometric
information by requiring notice before collection and giving them the

130. Id. at 2220 (citations omitted).
131. Id.
132. Id. Justice Roberts notes the connection to the First Amendment’s freedom of association:
because the CSLI would reveal a person’s location, it would also reveal the people and
organizations with whom a person chose to associate. Whether Carpenter could be read as a First
Amendment opinion (especially given the prior jurisprudence of Justice Roberts) is beyond the
scope of this article.
133. See generally Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/1–99 (2008);
Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., No. 123186, 2019 WL 323902, at *8 (Ill. Jan. 25, 2019).
134. See generally Patel v. Facebook Inc., 290 F. Supp. 3d 948 (N.D. Cal. 2018), aff’d, No. 1815982, 2019 WL 3727424 (9th Cir. Aug. 8, 2019) (regarding a consolidated class action). Further,
because Patel was litigated in federal court, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a slightly
different standard applies. As noted earlier, Article III standing requirements and the precedent of
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) apply to Patel, but not to Rosenbach. See generally
supra note 2. Though worthy of further development, that issue is outside the scope of this article.
135. The Ninth Circuit recently affirmed the Northern District of California’s Patel decision.
See generally Patel, 2019 WL 3727424.
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power to say no by withholding consent. These procedural protections
“are particularly crucial in our digital world because technology now
permits the wholesale collection and storage of an individual’s unique
biometric identifiers—identifiers that cannot be changed if
compromised or misused.” When a private entity fails to adhere to the
statutory procedure, as defendants are alleged to have done here, “the
right of the individual to maintain [his or] her biometric privacy
vanishes into thin air. The precise harm the Illinois legislature sought to
prevent is then realized.” This is no mere technicality. The injury is real
and significant.136

By recognizing the harm as the mere disclosure of biometric
information, the courts engage with a contextual concept of privacy.
Further, by recognizing the importance of consent—the very harm
envisioned by the statute—the courts signal that context is important. The
type of information at issue is not a mere phone number, or even a social
security number, but rather the core immutable identifying features of an
individual.137
D. Deviance and Contextual Privacy
Returning to deviance and the nothing to hide argument, a discussion
of deviance adds to the nothing to hide debate in two respects. First, the
contextual definition of deviance helps to explain the framing problem.
Second, the contextual definition of deviance mirrors the contextual
definition of privacy. As to the framing problem, the nothing to hide
argument assumes a zero-sum outcome between individual privacy and
collective security. The assumption encapsulates one of the central
tensions in rights discourse—the tension between an individual and a
collective.138 Even if we were to accept the framing of the issue as
individual privacy versus collective security, including the value of
deviance changes the equation. The benefits of individual privacy have
been undervalued because traditional views of privacy do not account for
the value to individuals in controlling the release of deviant information.
136. Rosenbach, 2019 WL 323902, at *6 (citations omitted) (citing Patel, 290 F. Supp. at 953–
54).
137. Biometric identifiers work by noting small and measurable physical differences among
individuals.
138. See AMITAI ETZIONI, THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY 187–88, 196 (1999) (discussing the
development of tension between individual privacy and governmental forces taking away privacy).
See also SOLOVE, FALSE TRADEOFF, supra note 99, at 48–49 (discussing the conflict between the
right of privacy to an individual and the good of society). The central tensions are: the tension
between individuals, the tension between an individual and a collective, the tension between
collectives, and the tension between contextual fairness and universal application. The description
of these tensions deserves a more detailed analysis; however, that analysis is beyond the scope of
this paper.
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Individuals gain value in self-preservation and self-promotion through a
nuanced and contextual disclosure of personal information. Likewise, the
value of collective security has been overinflated. Calculations of
collective security omit the costs to individuals of revealing deviant
information, and the cost to the collective in limiting the range of human
expression by suppressing the outliers.
The concept of deviance also enriches the discussion of privacy and
security because the contextual definition of deviance mirrors the
contextual definition of privacy. Like deviance, privacy is relative and
constructed. The concept of deviance examines the behaviors, beliefs, or
characteristics of the principal, as well as the effect of those behaviors,
beliefs, or characteristics on others. It is the negative reaction of the
receiver of the information that defines deviance. Likewise, in privacy,
the audience—and the likely reaction of the audience—is what makes
something worth protecting as private. Further, just as there is not a single
definition of deviance, there is no single definition for privacy.
III. PRIVACY, SURVEILLANCE, AND THE VALUE OF DEVIANCE
A. Concepts of Privacy
The concept of privacy is better understood as a range of ideas and
concepts; each deserving a different treatment. In Privacy and Freedom,
Alan Westin defined privacy as “the claim of individuals, groups or
institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent
information about them is communicated to others.”139 William Prosser
described common law privacy in tort law, which recognized “public
disclosure of embarrassing private facts” and “intrusion . . . into private
affairs.”140 Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren defined privacy as
protecting “the private life, habits, acts, and relations of an individual.”141
Several scholars have proposed different schemes using privacy as a
means of protecting identity. Notably, Professor Helen Nissenbaum
describes privacy as “Contextual Integrity,” where determinations about
privacy require an analysis of appropriateness and distribution.142
139. ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967).
140. William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
141. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 110, at 193, 216.
142. See generally Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119,
136–143 (2004) [hereinafter Nissenbaum, Contextual Integrity]; Helen Nissenbaum, A Contextual
Approach to Privacy Online, DAEDALUS no. 4, Fall 2011, at 32–43, https://www.amacad.org/
sites/default/files/daedalus/downloads/11_fall_nissenbaum.pdf [https://perma.cc/5KXD-YUNZ]
[hereinafter Nissenbaum, Privacy Online].
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Appropriateness concerns “appropriating information from one situation
and inserting it into another,” while distribution, or “flow,” examines
norms of transfer, including confidentiality, discretion, choice, and
need.143 Nissenbaum’s model builds on the work of James Rachels, who
focused on relationships as a key to privacy. “[T]he sort of relationship
that people have to one another involves a conception of how it is
appropriate for them to behave with each other, and what is more, a
conception of the kind and degree of knowledge concerning one another
which it is appropriate for them to have.”144
Some scholars see two different aspects of privacy—decisional or
autonomous privacy, which concerns intimate decisions, and a separate
right to be left alone. Professor Julie Inness describes privacy as
protecting “intimacy—privacy’s content covers intimate information,
access, and decisions.”145 Similarly, Professor Sherry Colb separates
substantive privacy issues of contraception, familial decisions, and
intimate relationships from the procedural privacy of the Fourth
Amendment.146 Some have described privacy as a fundamental aspect of
humanity.147 Others disagree with the concept of privacy as a right,
holding instead that privacy should be viewed in context with other
interests in line with the general good of society. 148 Still others have
favored defining privacy-type interests as a form of personal security.149
The challenge is to avoid the temptation to use a simplistic definition
of privacy when one does not exist. Privacy is a layered, dynamic, and
contextual concept. Because it is difficult to define, privacy is also
difficult to enforce. Frequently, privacy concerns arise when privacy is
breached through surveillance technologies that continue to flourish
143. Nissenbaum, Contextual Integrity, supra note 142, at 136–43.
144. JAMES RACHELS, Why Privacy is Important, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF
PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 290, 294 (Ferdinand D. Schoeman ed., 1984).
145. INNESS, supra note 110, at 56.
146. Sherry Colb, The Qualitative Dimensions of the Fourth Amendment’s “Reasonableness”,
98 COLUM. L. REV. 1642, 1642–43 (1998) (describing the liberty interest in engaging in certain
activities or promoting certain status).
147. Charles Fried, for example, viewed privacy in Kantian terms such that it must be
recognized without regard for the maximization of welfare of the community. Charles Fried,
Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 478 (1968); see Solove, Misunderstandings of Privacy, supra note 99,
at 760 (discussing the social value of privacy as an individual right).
148. See, e.g., ETZIONI, supra note 138; see also Solove, Misunderstandings of Privacy, supra
note 99, at 761 (referring to Amitai Ezioni); SOLOVE, FALSE TRADEOFF, supra note 100, at 48–49
(referring to Amitai Ezioni’s theories on privacy).
149. See Casey, supra note 4, at 1027–31 (advocating for interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment as protecting a personal right to be secure, rather than a “reasonable expectation of
privacy”).
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without regard for the broader implications of their impact on both
individuals and on society.
B. Predictive and Regulatory Surveillance
There are two types of surveillance, distinguished by purpose and
implementation: the first is what I call predictive surveillance, and the
second, I will refer to as regulatory surveillance.150 Predictive
surveillance is designed to gather information for the purpose of
predicting future behavior based on observations of their past actions.
This type of surveillance includes gathering information to predict future
crimes, dangerousness, the likelihood of returning to a court hearing (pretrial release and bail requirements), and the likelihood of recidivism.151
Apart from a criminal context, predictive surveillance describes as the
gathering of information about desires and preferences in order to obtain
a commercial advantage over the subject or to predict voting patterns.152
In law enforcement, this type of surveillance can be a valuable tool to

150. Other scholars have defined categories of surveillance. For example, Deven Desai notes
the distinction between prospective surveillance, which is highly regulated, and retrospective
surveillance, which is almost limitless. See generally Deven R. Desai, Constitutional Limits on
Surveillance: Associational Freedom in the Age of Data Hoarding, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 579
(2014).
151. See generally Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, 94 WASH. UNIV.
L. REV. 1115 (2016). Professor Ferguson describes the prevalence and expansion of predictive
policing, “policing strategies that promise the holy grail of policing—stopping crime before it
happens.” Id. at 1112–16. Ferguson describes the application of predictive technologies in several
aspects of law enforcement, including pre-trial risk assessment models, predictions of future
dangerousness, post-trial sentencing to forecast recidivism, and likely probation violations. Id. at
1119. The information used to make these predictions can be as varied as locations of past crimes,
to social media postings. Id. at 1113, 1118 n.8, 1126, 1140. For our purposes, it is important to note
that the gathering of information for the purpose of predictive policing would constitute what I call
predictive surveillance.
152. See, e.g., Gurbaksh Chahal, Election 2016: Marriage of Big Data, Social Data will
Determine the Next President, WIRED (May 2013), https://www.wired.com/insights/2013/05/
election-2016-marriage-of-big-data-social-data-will-determine-the-next-president/ [https://perma.
cc/3NCA-XMV5]; Issie Lapowsky, What Did Cambridge Analytica Really Do For Trump’s
Campaign?, WIRED (Oct. 26, 2017, 6:26 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/what-did-cambridgeanalytica-really-do-for-trumps-campaign/ [https://perma.cc/W4RZ-CEUL]; Nicole Kobie, This
Algorithm Knows How You Will Vote Based on the Car You Drive, WIRED (Dec. 2, 2017),
https://www.wired.co.uk/article/car-ownership-vote-democrat-republican-algorithm-stanford
[https://perma.cc/5MB2-R97W]. On price discrimination, see Neil Howe, A Special Price Just for
You, FORBES (Nov. 17, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/neilhowe/2017/11/17/a-special-pricejust-for-you/#66a513e690b3 [https://perma.cc/Y3PN-HFTV] (describing different prices offered
to consumers based on specific data points, such as origination zip code). See also Tobie Stanger,
Play the Dynamic Pricing Game to Win, CONSUMER REPORTS (Oct. 26, 2017),
https://www.consumerreports.org/prices-price-comparison/play-the-dynamic-pricing-game-towin-holiday-shopping/ [https://perma.cc/7F6B-HEML].
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gather evidence of criminal behavior. In the national security context, this
type of surveillance can be used to identify and track threats or to trace
threats to their sources in order to identify additional threats. In
commercial applications, the “holy grail” of information gathering would
be a system of perfect price discrimination, such that the producer would
charge each consumer exactly the maximum price that each consumer
would pay.153
Predictive surveillance must remain hidden or concealed from the
target of surveillance: the surveillance is covert. The subject can be
observed in a natural state, and the decision-making process and the
factors that influence the subject’s behavior can be recorded for use in the
future. Predictive surveillance functions best in private spaces where the
subject feels unconstrained by social pressures to conform. Where the
subject is aware of the surveillance, he may change his behavior or his
decision-making process in order to achieve an advantage over the
watcher. Examples of this type of surveillance include most commercial
applications, and some aspects of national security surveillance—those
designed to identify and predict threats.154
In contrast, what I refer to as regulatory surveillance is designed to
regulate conduct, relying on the assumption that people will modify their
behavior when they are being watched. The goal of regulatory
surveillance is to deter certain types of conduct. Therefore, one of the key
characteristics of regulatory surveillance is that the subject must be aware
of the surveillance (or the possibility of surveillance) in order to achieve
the desired effect. This type of surveillance functions best where the
surveillance is obvious.
Systems of regulatory surveillance often are deployed in public spaces
where we are most concerned about compliance with standards of
behavior. Examples of regulatory surveillance include closed circuit
cameras on streets, security cameras, workplace monitoring systems, the
use of metal detectors at schools, and the TSA apparatus at airports.
Over time, the two systems overlap. When systems or methods of
153. “[A] retailer’s ultimate goal is to increase sales and profit . . . . The key to successful
dynamic pricing is knowing which prices to change, when and by how much.” IBM Commerce
White Paper, Attracting and Retaining Customers with Insights-Driven Dynamic Pricing, IBM
CORPORATION (2016), https://www.ibm.com/downloads/cas/D2PPJYGV [https://perma.cc/4LAJ4B9V].
154. See generally Daniel R. Coats, Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of
the U.S. Intelligence Community, SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE (Jan. 29, 2019),
https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2019-ATA-SFR---SSCI.pdf [https://perma.cc/DC8VB39F].
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predictive surveillance become well-known, they transform into systems
of regulatory surveillance. Thus, even when a covert, predictive system
of surveillance becomes known, it does not lose its value. Although a
system of predictive surveillance may lose efficacy in terms of catching
the subject unaware, it can still function as a mechanism of behavioral
control. Assuming that nothing remains a secret forever, all predictive
systems of surveillance eventually become systems of regulatory
surveillance.
In relation to deviance, predictive surveillance can help define
difference, which is the starting point for defining deviance.155
Regulatory surveillance, on the other hand, attempts to suppress deviant
behavior through deterrence by increasing the subject’s estimate of the
probability of disclosure.
Our hypothetical case of Nic jaywalking includes examples of
predictive and regulatory surveillance. If the closed-circuit cameras were
hidden the surveillance would be predictive, with a goal of catching Nic
and Andi. But the cameras were placed in a conspicuous location with
signs identifying their presence. Thus, the surveillance was regulatory—
designed to modify behavior by informing Nic (and others) of a higher
probability of disclosure and deterring him from jaywalking. Note that
regulatory surveillance depends on the subject’s belief that surveillance
is working. For that reason, a dummy camera can be an effective tool for
regulatory surveillance because the subject is deterred by the belief he is
under surveillance.
The idea of using a subject’s belief that he is being watched as a
mechanism for controlling or modifying behavior is not new. Jeremy
Bentham employed a regulatory surveillance system in his description of
the Panopticon, where prisoners believed they were under constant
surveillance.156 So, too, the idea of controlling deviant behavior (whether
through regulatory surveillance or other means) is not new. Much of the
sociological literature on deviance connects to a theme of social
155. Surveillance technologies are designed to capture data from an environment. Once the data
has been collected, it must be organized and analyzed. In predictive analytics, a software program
or algorithm will identify patterns in the data. The patterns will detect correlations and connections
between data points, often by distinguishing where one data point differs from another data point.
Thus, the mathematical concept of deviation is an important step in the transformation of
information to actionable intelligence.
156. See generally JEREMY BENTHEM, THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHEM (John Bowring
1843); see also, Thomas McMullan, What Does the Panopticon Mean in the Age of Digital
Surveillance?,
THE
GUARDIAN
(July
23,
2015),
https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2015/jul/23/panopticon-digital-surveillance-jeremy-bentham [https://perma.cc/4TBXK6RT] (summarizing Benthem’s theory of Panopticon).
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control.157 But the question of whether we can suppress deviance is
different from whether we should suppress deviance.
C. Humanist Value of Deviance
There may be an economic value in deviance—people may find
economic value in the very behaviors and characteristics that make them
deviant. For example, Nic found economic benefit in jaywalking.
Additionally, there may be a social value of deviance—people may form
valued relationships based on shared qualities and traits that may be
deviant. Nic and Andi may find friendship based on their jaywalking. But
there is also a humanist value of deviance. Separate and apart from the
value that the individual who expresses the deviant trait might have in
controlling information related to that trait, society has a stake in limiting
the suppression of deviance. The things that one may feel the need to hide
—deviant characteristics, traits, beliefs or behavior—turn out to be the
same things that define each person as an individual. We are not
individuals by virtue of our similarities, but rather, because of our
differences—and the fact that no two people (even genetically identical
twins) are the same. Each person has defining features that make a person
an individual. Deviance, at the core, is difference, and there is benefit to
all in the preservation and propagation of different beliefs, behavior, and
characteristics.158 By expressing value for deviance we support the notion
of individuality and our human capacity for self-determination.159
As noted from our earlier discussion, deviance applies to any
difference that can be judged and that creates the possibility of harm to
the subject. The harm could be in the form of social castigation or in
formal punishment. Importantly, there is no fixed definition of deviant
behavior. Deviance could describe voluntary choices or immutable
characteristics over which the actor has no control. Critically, disclosure

157. See generally DOWNES ET AL., supra note 30.
158. Professor Julie Cohen eloquently states the argument for privacy: “Privacy shelters
dynamic emergent subjectivity from the efforts of commercial actors to render individuals and
communities fixed, transparent, and predictable. It protects the situated practices of boundary
management through which the capacity for self-determination develops.” Julie Cohen, What
Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1905 (2013). Professor Cohen further explains that
“[p]rivacy therefore is an indispensable structural feature of liberal democratic political systems.”
Id. at 1905. She cautions that “a society that values innovation ignores privacy at its peril, for
privacy also shelters the processes of play and experimentation from which innovation emerges.”
Id. at 1905–06.
159. Id. See also JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE AND THE
PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE 16–20 (2012) (discussing the history of individualism and theories
of privacy).
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of information about deviance could be advantageous or
disadvantageous, depending on the context. Release of information to one
group could create positive social interactions, while disclosure to
another group could result in negative social consequences.
The disclosure of information relates specifically to the freedom of
association and the free expression of ideas. Solove suggests that
[t]he value of protecting against chilling effects is not measured simply
by focusing on the particular individuals who are deterred from
exercising their rights. Chilling effects harm society because, among
other things, they reduce the range of viewpoints expressed and the
degree of freedom with which to engage in political activity.160

There is another more basic facet of deviance that concerns a
fundamental aspect of human identity. 161 Personal identity is comprised
of the aggregation of personal deviance—the manner in which each
person differs from other people and from the norm. Each person has the
ability to form an identity, which may require the amplification of certain
characteristics and the suppression of other preferences or characteristics.
We are defined by our differences and the aspects of our identity that
make each person unique.
Suppression of deviance, then, results in a suppression of the range of
human potential. By its definition, deviance concerns the fringes or
outliers within a society or group. But as noted above, judgments about
which types of behaviors, beliefs, or characteristics should be suppressed
are highly subjective, and these judgments change over time.
D. The Value of Deviance in Exposing Hidden Risks
There is a danger in the collection and housing of deep wells of
personal information by someone other than the owner of the
information. Professor Solove notes the distinction between the
Orwellian harms of surveillance, such as inhibition and social control,
and the “suffocating powerlessness and vulnerability” imposed by a
Kafkaesque bureaucratic state.162 Solove finds Kafka’s world far more
160. Solove, Misunderstandings of Privacy, supra note 99, at 765; see also Daniel Solove,
Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083,
1117–37 (2002) (discussing lack of protection and ease of governmental access to information from
third-party collectors); Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 112, 154–59 (2007) (discussing chilling effect of surveillance). But see supra note 10
(discussing the stultification thesis); Sklansky, supra note 19, at 1092–94 (discussing the effects of
surveillance).
161. Deviance is not a pejorative term. It simply implies difference, although a difference that
could have negative social consequences.
162. Solove, Misunderstandings of Privacy, supra note 99, at 766.
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nebulous—a “bureaucracy with inscrutable purposes that uses people’s
information to make important decisions about them, but denies the
people the ability to participate in how their information is used.”163
The increased use of surveillance is a troubling, but perhaps
unavoidable, trend. The preservation of vast quantities of data in the
hands of governments and other entities, along with the capacity to
confirm prejudices of the researcher, heightens the likelihood that data
could be used against the interests of the subject of the surveillance.164
Moreover, advances in search technology provide increased
opportunities and temptations to use a person’s information against him
or her. Advanced search tools can examine data for indications of
emotional states, such that one could, for example, search a trove of email
for indications of anger.165
A recent story about the digitization of library collections highlights
the danger of huge data and advanced search technologies. Benjamin
Moser, the curator of the library from Susan Sontag, remarked on the
capacity to search the collection, which included thousands of emails and
other electronic communications. Moser noted the power transferred to
the holder of vast quantities of information, and the ability of search
engines to find evidence of emotion. “Going through these things requires
even more tact. There is a real temptation to go in there and say, ‘Gosh,
this was a really angry woman.’ It makes it very easy to reduce
people[.]”166 He further noted that “you can put your prejudices into the
system and see them reflected instantly due to the sheer amount of things

163. Id. at 756–57; DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN
8–9 (2004) (discussing Kafka’s depiction of bureaucracy).
164. Obvious examples of the use of surveillance against the subject of surveillance include the
use of wire taps and other forms of electronic surveillance against criminal suspects and the use of
consumer data for price discrimination. See supra notes 148–152 and accompanying text.
165. Researchers reported on the success of a computer system in recognizing true emotional
states of people. Marian Bartlett et al., Automatic Decoding of Deceptive Pain Expressions,
CURRENT BIOLOGY (Mar. 31, 2014), http://www.cell.com/current-biology/abstract/S09609822%2814%2900147-X [https://perma.cc/SPU8-V7D9]; Patricia Donovan, Ouch! Computer
System Can Spot Real or Faked Expressions of Pain Better Than People, UB NOW REPORTER
S.U.N.Y. BUFFALO (Apr. 7, 2014), http://www.buffalo.edu/ubnow/stories/2014/April/fake_
pain.html [https://perma.cc/3YVB-ZDXX]. Further, advances in facial recognition software enable
analysis of a person’s level of understanding. See generally Will Knight, Facial Analysis Software
Spots Struggling Students, M.I.T. TECH. REV. (July 1, 2013), http://www.technologyreview.com/
news/516606/facial-analysis-software-spots-struggling-students/ [https://perma.cc/RMJ4-CDYY].
166. All Tech Considered, The New Age: Leaving Behind Everything, Or Nothing At All,
Interview with U.C.L.A. librarian Benjamin Moser, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Apr. 9, 2014),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2014/04/09/300614977/the-new-age-leaving-behindeverything-or-nothing-at-all [https://perma.cc/G5M4-HJK3].
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people say digitally.”167 Given enough information, it would be possible
to produce evidence of anything.
The danger of the increased levels of data collection and retention lies
in the ability to find anything. But when the usual security versus privacy
dichotomy is presented, these risks are not evaluated. In particular, the
increased use of regulatory surveillance is flawed on two premises. First,
the benefit of regulatory surveillance is overstated because instruments
of social control may not effectively change behavior. In fact, increased
measures of social control could result in escalation of undesired deviant
behavior.168 Second, the regulatory surveillance increases the risk of
indiscriminate disclosure. By indiscriminate disclosure, I mean
disclosure that is not controlled by the owner of the information for selfdefined purposes of preservation or advancement.
Does increased social control reduce deviance? The logic of this
proposition seems sound—we should be able to change the behavior of
outliers to bring these outliers into conformity with normal standards. But
the empirical evidence leads us to the opposite conclusion. Increased
measures of social control either have no effect on deviant behavior, or,
quite surprisingly, these measures may have a tendency to increase levels
of deviance.169 Thus, the imposition of measures of social control can
actually be the cause of more deviant behavior.170
CONCLUSION
An analysis of deviance adds value to a discussion of privacy concerns.
First, the contextual definition of deviance mirrors the complicated and
contextual definition of privacy. Second, an understanding of deviance
highlights the faulty risk assessment of increased surveillance because of
the reliance on an assumption that deviance is always negative. Finally,
there is a social value to deviance in expanding and preserving the full
expression of humanity, but that full expression of humanity can only be
protected through a contextual understanding of privacy.

167. Id.
168. TANNENBAUM, supra note 50, at 17–19.
169. See generally EDWIN E.M. LEMERT, HUMAN DEVIANCE, SOCIAL PROBLEMS, AND SOCIAL
CONTROL (Neil J. Smelser ed., 2d ed. 1972).
170. See generally TANNENBAUM, supra note 50 (discussing how more regulation was the
cause of more rebellion of criminal behavior).

